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I. INTRODUCTION
Albert Brumley, author of the hit gospel song, I’ll Fly Away, formed
a corporation to hold his copyrights and subsequently sold his interest
in the business to two of his six children.1  Lifetime transfer of assets
through a business entity is a well-recognized estate planning tech-
nique.2  With virtually any other type of property, the story would
have ended there.  Probably unbeknownst to Brumley and those who
assisted with his planning, the four Brumley children who were not
involved in the business retained a right to terminate the grant from
Brumley to the corporation.3  In 2006, these four delivered a termina-
tion notice to the corporation.4  Litigation ensued, appeal was taken,
and a jury eventually found for the four heirs and their descendants.5
The parties stipulated to the division of post-termination income.6
The termination provision of the Copyright Act was intended give
authors a chance to renegotiate unremunerative transfers.7  Though
Congress’s intent may have been to benefit authors, at least two ob-
servers have recognized that the termination provision makes it “diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for authors to engage in effective estate
planning.”8  The concept of recapture of copyright by authors has been
hotly debated at least twice, but there has been no critical examina-
tion of Congress’s choice to pass the termination interest through a
statutory class of successors rather than deferring to the author’s will.
In the proceedings leading up to the 1909 and 1976 Acts, Congress
dealt with a host of new technological developments, wrestled with the
constitutional implications of an extended term, and listened to
heated debates between authors and publishers.  Once agreement was
reached on renewal and termination, the debate moved on to other
1. Brumley v. Albert E. Brumley & Sons, Inc., 727 F.3d 574, 576 (6th Cir. 2013).
2. Robert G. Alexander & Dallas E. Klemmer, Creative Wealth Planning with Gran-
tor Trusts, Family Limited Partnerships, and Family Limited Liability Compa-
nies, 2 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 307, 310 (2010).
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2)(B) (2012) (providing that a deceased author’s termina-
tion interest may be owned by his surviving children); id. § 304(c)(3) (declaring
the termination window opens for five years beginning at the end of fifty-six
years after the date copyright was secured); id. § 304(d)(2) (shifting window to a
five-year period after the end of seventy-five years from the date the copyright
was secured).  Copyright to the song was originally secured in 1932. Brumley,
727 F.3d at 576.  The § 304(d)(2) window for termination ran from 2007 to 2012.
4. Brumley, 727 F.3d at 576.
5. Docket Report, Brumley v. Albert E. Brumley & Sons, No. 3:08-CV-01193 (M.D.
Tenn. July 9, 2010).
6. Stipulation Regarding Pre- and Post-Judgment Allocation of Post-Termination
Monies, Brumley, No. 3:08-CV-01193.
7. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), in 17 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY 124 (George Grossman ed., 1976) [hereinafter 1976 OMNIBUS].
8. Bridget J. Crawford & Mitchell M. Gans, Sticky Copyrights: Discriminatory Tax
Restraints on the Transfer of Intellectual Property, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 25, 73
(2010).
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pressing matters and the statutory class of successors remained unex-
amined.  This Note briefly examines the termination interest, outlines
the legislative history involving the statutory class of heirs, proposes a
modest revision that would give authors9 and publishers10 greater
certainty, and provides some suggestions for planners dealing with
the existing termination provision.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TERMINATION
The Copyright Act contains three termination provisions.  The
first, § 203 applies to grants made by the author after January 1,
1978.11  The second, § 304(c), applies to pre-1978 grants of rights to a
work that was still covered by copyright on January 1, 1978, and that
were made by the author, her surviving spouse or children, her execu-
tors, or failing all of the above, her next-of-kin.12  The third, § 304(d),
applies to grants of copyrights in their renewal terms on October 27,
1998, by the same grantors in § 304(c), and is available only if a
§ 304(c) termination right has not already been exercised.13  A grant
of rights to a work made for hire is not subject to termination under
any of the three provisions.14
Once the termination window opens, the holder (or holders) of the
termination interest may end a grantee’s rights in a work by serving
notice within the statutorily prescribed period.15  Generally, when the
termination becomes effective, the rights that were the subject of the
grant revert to those who owned a termination interest, whether or
not they joined in the termination.16  For pre-1978 grants executed by
persons other than the author, the rights under the grant revert to the
surviving person who executed the grant.17
9. The term “author” is used broadly in this Note and refers to producers of copy-
rightable material.  Accordingly, the term embraces writers, visual artists, com-
posers, choreographers, dramatists, audiovisual creators, and architects.  17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).  For an in-depth discussion of the meaning of “author” in
the context of copyright, see Russ VerSteeg, Defining “Author” for Purposes of
Copyright, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1323 (1996).
10. The term “publisher” is also used in a broad sense and is intended to encompass
any party who purchases or licenses rights covered by copyright.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
12. Id. § 304(c) (2012).
13. Id. § 304(d).
14. Id. §§ 203(a), 304(c), 304(d) (each addressing works “other than a work made for
hire”).
15. Id. §§ 203(a)(4), 304(c)(3)–(5).
16. Id. §§ 203(b), 304(c)(6).
17. Id. § 304(c)(6).  Pre-1978 grants are terminable by persons other than the author
because under the law existing at the time, widows, children, and next of kin of
authors had made contingent assignments of renewal terms. H.R. REP. NO. 89-
2237, at 137 (1966).  Congress wanted to give these statutory beneficiaries an
opportunity to terminate and reclaim the benefit of the renewal term. Id.
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The foregoing is complicated—and controversial—enough, but
there is a further curiosity to the Act’s termination provisions: Once
an author dies, the termination interest does not pass through the au-
thor’s estate but instead is divided among a class of statutory
successors:
(2) Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is
owned, and may be exercised, as follows:
(A) The widow or widower owns the author’s entire termina-
tion interest unless there are any surviving children or
grandchildren of the author, in which case the widow or
widower owns one-half of the author’s interest.
(B) The author’s surviving children, and the surviving children
of any dead child of the author, own the author’s entire ter-
mination interest unless there is a widow or widower, in
which case the ownership of one-half of the author’s inter-
est is divided among them.
(C) The rights of the author’s children and grandchildren are
in all cases divided among them and exercised on a per
stirpes basis according to the number of such author’s chil-
dren represented; the share of the children of a dead child
in a termination interest can be exercised only by the ac-
tion of a majority of them.
(D) In the event that the author’s widow or widower, children,
and grandchildren are not living, the author’s executor, ad-
ministrator, personal representative, or trustee shall own
the author’s entire termination interest.18
The real difficulty for planners arises from another portion of the stat-
ute, which provides, “Termination of the grant may be effected not-
withstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement
to make a will or to make any future grant.”19  In other words, authors
cannot vary ownership of the termination interest by contract, and are
thus stuck with Congress’s choice.
The statutory successor scheme coupled with the non-alienation
provision means that any lifetime grant by an author is subject to ter-
mination after thirty-five years.  From an estate planning perspective,
this undermines certainty in property transfers and raises questions
about whether the rights under the grant should be included in the
author’s estate.20  From a policy perspective, this result is questiona-
ble; authors are really in the best place to understand the needs of
their survivors, not Congress.  If the rationale behind recapture is re-
ally to give authors the ability to renegotiate grants of a right that is
18. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2).  The same class of successors is used in § 304(c)(2).
19. Id. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5).
20. See Crawford & Gans, supra note 8.
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difficult to value, forced succession is paternalistic and out of place in
the statute.  Other bodies of federal law place limits on the transfer of
property, but these limits are only “default” limits—the owner of the
property can override them.21  Why not copyright?
Though the general concept of recapture of copyright by authors
received exacting scrutiny in the proceedings that led to the 1909 and
1976 Copyright Acts, there is little evidence Congress has ever paused
to consider the wisdom of vesting inalienable rights in this class of
successors.  In fact, the legislative history suggests the opposite.  Stat-
utory successors first appeared in 1831; since then, the class of succes-
sors has been refined, but apparently has never been questioned.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SUCCESSORS IN REVERSION
AND TERMINATION
Before 1978, authors did not have the ability to terminate trans-
fers.  Instead, authors recaptured copyrights in a renewal term.  Be-
cause termination has its roots in renewal and reversion,22 this Part
examines the history of statutory successors to reverted rights and
how the same concept was imported into the termination provision.
A. 1790–1831
Under the 1790 Copyright Act, an author who survived the first
term of copyright was entitled to a renewal term, with rights during
that term, once secured by the author, vesting in the author, his “exec-
utors, administrators, or assigns.”23  If the author did not survive the
first term of copyright, copyright protection ceased at the end of that
term and the work entered the public domain.  As legislators would
later recognize, this limitation denied the benefits of copyright to the
21. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2012) (requiring pension plans to pay an annuity to
the surviving spouse of the participant, but permitting participants to designate
other beneficiaries with the spouse’s consent).
22. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearing on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R.
6835 Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 108
(1965) (statement of Irwin Karp, Authors League of America) (“[T]his [termina-
tion] clause would replace the present renewal clause of the 1909 act.  [The re-
newal clause] was specifically designed to permit authors to make grants of
rights in their work for a 28-year term and be able to reserve the rights to the
second 28 years of copyright because it is not only imprudent but also impossible
to bargain sensibly over rates and terms of compensation for literary property on
a perpetual basis.”), in 5 1976 OMNIBUS, pt. 1, at 108.
23. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Securing the Copies of Maps,
Charts, and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of Such Copies, During the
Times Therein Mentioned, 1 Stat. 124, ch. XV, § 1 (1790) (“[I]f, at the expiration
of the said [first] term, the author or authors, or any of them, be living, and a
citizen or citizens of these United States, or resident therein, the same exclusive
right shall be continued to him or them, his or their executors, administrators or
assigns, for the further term of fourteen years . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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author’s family at a time when it might be the only means of support
available to them.24
Beginning in 1826, lexicographer Noah Webster began lobbying
Congress for more extensive copyright protection.25  Webster’s en-
treaties were grounded in “the principle that an author has, by com-
mon law, or natural justice, the sole and permanent right to make
profit by his own labor.”26  Through his son-in-law, William Ellsworth,
member of the Representative and Judiciary Committee, Webster
sought support for an extension of author’s rights by looking to the
laws of other countries, including France.27  Early drafts of the bill did
not contain a statutory class of successors.28  However, when the bill
came up for debate, Ellsworth proposed an amendment entitling the
author’s “widow, child, or children” to renew copyright, in addition to
the author.29  In the final version of the 1831 Act, copyright in the
renewal term vested in the author or, if the author was deceased, “the
widow and child.”30  The Act also omitted assignees from the class of
renewal beneficiaries.31  As a result, the renewal term was treated by
courts as a new interest, separate from the interest under the first
term.32  Where an author assigned his or her rights for the first term,
the assignment was not treated as including the second term unless
the contract made clear that the parties’ agreement encompassed the
second term.33
24. H.R. REP. NO. 21-3, at 1 (1830) (report of the Committee on the Judiciary),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Q6YN-Z43J.
25. NOAH WEBSTER, Origin of the Copy-Right Laws in the United States, in A COLLEC-
TION OF PAPERS ON POLITICAL, LITERARY AND MORAL SUBJECTS 173, 175–76 (1843)
(letter to Daniel Webster, then a member of the House of Representatives).
26. Id. at 176.
27. See H.R. REP. NO. 21-3, at 2 (“In France, before 1826, a copy-right was secured to
the author for life, to his widow for her life, and then to his children for twenty-six
years.  In 1826, the King appointed a numerous board of commissioners [who]
reported a bill extending the period of enjoyment to fifty years after the death of
the author, which is now the law of France.”); WEBSTER, supra note 25, at 178
(“Mr. Ellsworth formed a report, stating the terms of time for which copy-rights
are secured to authors in Great Britain, France, Russia, Sweden, Denmark,
and . . . Germany.”).
28. See H.R. 140, 20th Cong. (1828).
29. 7 REG. DEB. 423 (1831), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/JXE5-YR5Z.
30. An Act to Amend the Several Acts Respecting Copy Rights, 4 Stat. 436, ch. XVI,
§ 2 (1831).
31. Id.
32. Pierpont v. Fowle, 19 F. Cas. 652, 660 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846).
33. Compare Pierpont, 19 F. Cas. at 659–60 (“[N]o one ever dreamed that an assignee
could alone take out the second or extended term, unless he has paid for it [and]
clearly contracted for it . . . .”), with Cowen v. Banks, 6 F. Cas. 669 (C.C.D. N.Y.
1862) (finding that the assignee held copyright for the renewal term where the
author testified, “I supposed the book to belong to my assignees as soon as made,
including all that was in it,” and further noting that the testimony was “wholly
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While Congress’s intent to benefit the author’s survivors is appar-
ent, its rationale for using a class of statutory successors rather than
passing the renewal right through the author’s estate is not.  In bor-
rowing the mechanics of survivor benefit from French law, the 1831
bill’s drafters may have unwittingly imported French law’s restric-
tions on succession of property, which are largely at odds with the
American preference for testamentary freedom.34
B. The 1909 Copyright Act
1. Conferences
In the years leading up to the passage of the 1909 Act, the Libra-
rian of Congress invited representatives of authors, playwrights, vis-
ual artists, composers, and publishers to a series of conferences on
copyright.35  Each conference discussion revolved around a term of
copyright based on the author’s life plus a term of years for most types
of works.36  This raised the question of who should benefit from the
extended term for existing works.
The memorandum draft bill composed by the Register of Copy-
rights after the first session contemplated that existing copyrights
would be automatically extended to the life-plus-fifty term “for the
sole use of the author” if the author was living; no extension was avail-
able for works by deceased authors.37  If a work was subject to assign-
inconsistent and irreconcilable with the idea” that the parties’ contract only con-
templated rights for the first term).
34. See Ray D. Madoff, A Tale of Two Countries: Comparing the Law of Inheritance in
Two Seemingly Opposite Systems, 37 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 333, 342–44
(2014) (describing limitations on testamentary freedom under French law, and
noting that laws of succession have been relatively stable in that country since
1804).
35. See LIBR. OF CONG. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEED-
INGS AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON COPYRIGHT, at V–V(b) (1905)
[hereinafter STENOGRAPHIC REPORT 2D SESS.], in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
1909 COPYRIGHT ACT, pt. D, at V–V(b) (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds.,
1976) [hereinafter 1909 OMNIBUS] (listing those invited for one such session).
36. See LIBR. OF CONG. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEED-
INGS AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON COPYRIGHT, 76–82 (1905), in 1
1909 OMNIBUS, pt. C, at 76–82 (discussing the Register of Copyright’s proposal for
a term of the author’s life plus fifty years); LIBR. OF CONG., COPYRIGHT OFFICE
BULL. NO. 10, MEMORANDUM DRAFT OF A BILL TO AMEND AND CONSOLIDATE THE
ACTS RESPECTING COPYRIGHT § 51(a) (1905), in 2 1909 OMNIBUS, pt. D, at XXXVII
(using a term of life plus fifty years for fine arts, musical and dramatic composi-
tions, and literary productions); LIBR. OF CONG., COPYRIGHT OFFICE BULL. NO. 10
(2d print), MEMORANDUM DRAFT OF A BILL TO AMEND AND CONSOLIDATE THE ACTS
RESPECTING COPYRIGHT § 56(c) (1906), in 3 1909 OMNIBUS, pt. E, at LIII–LIV (cre-
ating a life-plus-fifty-year term for original books, lectures, dramatic or musical
compositions, or artistic, cartographical, geographical, or other similar works).
37. COPYRIGHT OFFICE BULL. NO. 10 § 53 (1905), in 2 1909 OMNIBUS, pt. D, at
XXXVIII–XXXIX.
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ment, the assignment terminated on the same date it would have
under the prior act, with the remainder to revert and vest in the au-
thor of the work.38  The first memorandum draft listed as successors
to copyright as “[legal representatives?], administrators, executors, or
assigns” of the author.39  The draft also set forth the following:
Query:
After the death of the author, the copyright to pass:
1st, to his surviving widow, if any,
2d, to his surviving child by marriage or adoption, if any,
3d, to his surviving parent, if any,
4th to his surviving brother or sister if any.
Failing any such survivors the copyright to fall into the public
domain.
The Register raised the question at second session, asking
“whether [the property of the deceased author] should go uncondition-
ally to his widow and children or child.”40  Richard Bowker of the
American Authors’ Copyright League suggested revising the initial
list of successors to include “the executors, administrators, [heirs] or
assigns” of the author, but otherwise made no comment on the list of
successors.41  The ABA representative present at the conference noted
that in other statutes, “legal representative” was construed by courts
to mean the heirs, rather than the executor or administrator—which,
in his view, was not the intention of the conference.42  Perhaps
prompted by that comment, a representative of the Print Publisher’s
Association noted that those at the conference should attempt to agree
on “the idea of what we want and not the phraseology,” leaving the
latter for “the legal gentlemen.”43
The second memorandum draft, which guided discussion at the
third session, limited successors to the author’s “[heirs,] executors,
and administrators” for purposes of obtaining copyright, and rights to
an extended term for an existing copyright.44  That phrasing proved
too broad for publishers, who feared having to deal with large num-
bers of heirs to obtain the extended term.45  The publishers’ proposal
limited rights for any extension term to the author, or his widow or
38. Id.
39. Id. § 20.
40. STENOGRAPHIC REPORT 2D SESS., supra note 35, at 142.
41. Id. at 143.
42. Id. at 145.
43. Id. at 147.
44. LIBR. OF CONG. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, BULL. NO. 10 (2d print), MEMORANDUM DRAFT
OF A BILL TO AMEND AND CONSOLIDATE THE ACTS RESPECTING COPYRIGHT §§ 21,
60, 66(c) (1906), in 3 1909 OMNIBUS, pt. E, at XXIX, LII, LIV.
45. LIBR. OF CONG. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON COPYRIGHT 297–98 (1906), in 3
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children, with existing assignments of copyright persisting.46  Even
this, the publishers noted, presented the risk that an “obstructing
child” would “insist upon securing a bonus” before he would permit a
publisher to continue publication.47  The representative of the Ameri-
can Authors Copyright League found the proposal a “perfectly accept-
able” compromise,48 reflecting the general principle of benefitting
living authors and their immediate descendants.49
Vesting the extended term in the author or his family was also po-
litically expedient.  Arthur Steuart of the ABA found it “highly im-
probable that Congress [would] be willing to extend copyrights which
[were] about to expire for the benefit of the publisher,” and would only
do it, if at all, to reward the author or his family.50  Steuart pointed
out that the publishers’ proposal excluded from the benefit those au-
thors who had assigned their copyright.51  Ansley Wilcox, a lawyer,
suggested that with respect to works for which copyright had been as-
signed, extension should be available only upon the joint petition of
the author (if living, and if not his widow or child) and the assignee.52
Conference attendees concluded that extension by agreement was the
fairest way of ensuring that the publishers’ investment in plates was
protected, while still giving the author (or his widow or child) the
chance to benefit.53
2. Congressional Proceedings
Congress considered several copyright bills in the years leading up
to the 1909 Act.  As introduced, the first 1907 bill provided for an ini-
tial twenty-eight year term, renewable by “the proprietor” for a fur-
ther term extending for the life of the author plus thirty years.54  The
class of statutory successors from the 1831 Act is repeated, but only
with respect to extension and renewal of copyrights already in exis-
tence.55  The committee report noted the shortcomings of the statu-
tory successors to renewal rights; vesting them in the proprietor was
the Committee’s apparent solution:
1909 OMNIBUS, pt. E, at 297–98 (statement of George Haven Putnam, secretary of
the American Publishers’ Copyright League).
46. Id. at 299.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 299–300.
49. Id. at 302.
50. Id. at 300 (statement of Arthur Steuart, Chairman, American Bar Association
Advisory Committee).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 301–02.
53. Id. at 301–04.
54. H.R. 25133, 59th Cong. § 18(c) (1907), in 6 1909 OMNIBUS, pt. N, at N19,
N31–N32.
55. Id. § 19.
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The copyright term under existing law is twenty-eight years, with a right of
renewal by the author, or his widow or children, if he be dead, for a further
term of fourteen years.  This renewal right does not extend to a husband, or to
grandchildren, if children be dead, or even to parents, so that the death of an
unmarried author ends a copyright at the end of twenty-eight years, no mat-
ter what its value may be, or how many people may be dependent upon the life
of the author.56
For new copyrights, a term extending beyond the life of the author
was viewed as sufficient “[t]o enable him to provide for his children
until they reach the age where they are likely to be self-supporting, or,
if daughters, married.”57  If an author was deceased, the proprietor of
the work, or the author’s executors, administrators, or assigns were
entitled to obtain copyright.58
None of the early bills contemplated reversion of the renewal term
to the author with respect to new works.  The concept of reversion only
appears with respect to existing works:
[T]he copyright subsisting in any work at the time when this Act goes into effect
may, at the expiration of the renewal term provided for under existing law, be
further renewed and extended by the author, if he be still living, or if he be
dead, leaving a widow, by his widow, or in her default or if no widow survive
him, by his children, if any survive him, for a further period such that the
entire term shall be equal to that secured by this Act, and the privileges se-
cured hereunder to the widows of authors shall equally be enjoyed by the wid-
owers of authors, and if such author, widow, widower, or children shall not be
living at the passage of this Act, then his or her heirs, executors, or adminis-
trators shall be entitled to the privilege of renewal and extension granted
under this section . . . .59
The Committees on Patents of the House and Senate held a joint
hearing on the final House and Senate bills on March 26, 27, and 28,
1908.60  The latest bills from the House and Senate submitted to the
joint committee permitted the author or proprietor, or his executors,
administrators, or assigns to obtain copyright.61  To obtain the full
term, the proprietor of the copyright was to record notice with the cop-
56. H.R. REP. NO. 59–7083, at 13 (1907), in 6 1909 OMNIBUS, pt. N, at 13.
57. S. REP. NO. 59-6187, at 6 (1907), in 6 1909 OMNIBUS, pt. Q, at 7.
58. LIBR. OF CONG. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, BULL. NO. 12, THE COPYRIGHT BILL: S. 6330;
H.R. 19853 59TH CONGRESS COMPARED WITH COPYRIGHT STATUTES NOW IN FORCE
AND EARLIER UNITED STATES ENACTMENTS § 8 (1906), in 1 1909 OMNIBUS, pt. B, at
16; H.R. 243, 60th Cong. § 9 (1907), in 6 1909 OMNIBUS, pt. T, at T4–T5; S. 2499,
60th Cong. § 9 (1907), in 6 1909 OMNIBUS, pt. T, at T37–T38; S. 2900, 60th Cong.
§ 8 (1907), in 6 1909 OMNIBUS, pt. T, at T71; H.R. 11794, 60th Cong. § 8 (1908), in
6 1909 OMNIBUS, pt. T, at T106.
59. S. 2900 § 26 (emphasis added).  Earlier bills contained substantially the same
language, though S. 2900 added and H.R. 11794 retained the final provision enti-
tling, for existing works, the author’s heirs, executors, and administrators to re-
new in the absence of a widow and children. See H.R. 243 § 27; S. 2499 § 27.
60. Hearings Before the Comms. on Patents of the S. and H.R. on Pending Bills to
Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 60th Cong. (1908) [herein-
after March 1908 Hearings], in 5 1909 OMNIBUS, Pt. K.
61. S. 2900 § 8; H.R. 11794 § 8.
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yright office after the first twenty-eight year term.62  As in the confer-
ence drafts, reversion to a statutory class of successors only operated
for renewals of copyright in existing works.63  The reversion first
vested in the author; where the author was dead, his widow (or wid-
ower); or the author’s children if no spouse survived the author.64
Where an author was not survived by a spouse or children, the au-
thor’s “heirs, executors, or administrators” held the privilege of re-
newal and extension.65
George Haven Putnam, representing the American Publishers
Copyright League, represented the extension provision as “the consen-
sus of opinion arrived at by the authors and publishers after a discus-
sion extending over some eighteen months.”66  Putnam explained that
the principal controversy with respect to extending existing copyrights
was that book publishers’ business model anticipated an exclusive as-
signment for a forty-two-year term, after which they could recoup
their investment in printing plates by being early to market with the
work once it fell into the public domain.67  If the extended term for
existing work was to invest in authors, publishers worried that au-
thors would assign the extended term to another publisher, rendering
the first publisher’s plates worthless.68  The conference’s conclusion
was that a joint application for renewal allowed the benefit of the ex-
tended term to go to authors and their families while still protecting
publishers’ investment in plates.69
It became apparent at the hearing that the House of Representa-
tives was unlikely to pass a bill extending the term to life plus thirty
years.70  Perhaps as a consolation to authors, Representative Currier
raised the fact that the renewal system was a boon to at least some
authors.71  To illustrate his case, Currier recounted a conversation
with a famous author: “Mr. Samuel Clemens told me he found [the
renewal] of very great importance to him; that he sold the copyright of
62. S. 2900 § 24; H.R. 11794 § 24.
63. S. 2900 § 26; H.R. 11794 § 26.
64. S. 2900 § 26; H.R. 11794 § 26.
65. S. 2900 § 26; H.R. 11794 § 26.
66. March 1908 Hearings, supra note 60, at 17.
67. Id. at 18–19.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 61 (providing statements of Rep. Currier that “there would be a good deal of
difficulty, probably, in getting through the House” a term of life plus thirty years,
and that it would face “great opposition”); id. at 64–65 (providing statement of
Sen. Smoot that he would be satisfied with the existing term).
71. Id. at 62 (speaking to Mr. Johnson, a representative of the American Authors
Copyright League, asked: “Do you not think it would be to the advantage of the
authors . . . to [have] a renewal period?”).
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‘Innocents Abroad’ for a very small sum, and all her ever got out of it,
practically, was the renewal period.”72
W.B. Hale, representing the American Law Book Company,
pointed out that if the bill were to change from a straight term of life
to a series of renewals, in order to be consistent with existing law and
the extension provision, the renewal provision should go to the author
and statutory successors (rather than the proprietor).73  William Jen-
ner74 strongly advocated for renewal as a mechanism for renegoti-
ation.75  After what one imagines as a very emotional anti-publisher
statement by Jenner, Chairman Smoot asked him whether publishers
would simply contract with authors for any extension period.  Jenner
replied:
It is never done, and I have some doubt about whether it legally could be done.
But I should be glad to see that so provided for that it could not be done under
the law. . . . Put it in the bill itself, and say that it cannot be done, so that the
author is certain to have that extension as a provision for his age or a provi-
sion for his widow and his children.76
Jenner’s suggestion was met with applause, the session was ad-
journed, and renewal-as-renegotiation established a firm foothold in
the minds of authors.  Thomas Nelson Page, a lawyer and writer,
raised the issues of authors who do not leave widows or children, but
who may have another relative to support, and who may wish to leave
the termination right by will.77
The next bill introduced by Currier abandoned the idea of a term
based on the author’s life, and returned to a single term and a renewal
term vesting in the author, the author’s surviving spouse, the children
in the absence of a surviving spouse, or “the author’s heirs, or execu-
tors, or administrators” in the absence of a surviving spouse or child.78
The same structure was retained in the bill that became the Act of
72. Id. at 62.
73. Id. at 77.
74. Jenner wrote a book, The Publisher Against the People, which portrayed the 1906
legislation as the “wholly selfish” product of publishers, not in the interest of au-
thors or the public, and to be examined “with extreme caution and suspicion.”
WILLIAM A. JENNER, THE PUBLISHER AGAINST THE PEOPLE 2–3 (1907).
75. March 1908 Hearings, supra note 60, at 127 (“Why should you not give [the au-
thor] an opportunity to make a new bargain with the old publisher, or go to a new
one?”).
76. Id. at 128.
77. Id. at 140.
78. See The New Copyright Drafts, 73 THE PUBLISHERS WKLY. 1873, 1875 (1908) (dis-
cussing H.R. 22183, 60th Cong. § 25 (1908)); COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 86TH CONG.,
STUDY NO. 31 ON RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT 122 (Comm. Print 1960) (prepared by
Barbara Ringer) (printed for the use by the Senate Subcommittee on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary) [hereinafter
1961 RENEWAL STUDY].
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1909.79  Nothing in the record indicates why Congress preferred statu-
tory successors over a will for authors leaving surviving spouses or
children.  As Barbara Ringer noted in her study of the renewal right,
“It is regrettable that, after years of consideration and study, one of
the most important provisions of the bill should have been pieced to-
gether and hastily enacted without any real analysis of the
consequences.”80
C. The 1976 Act
The consequences became clear in subsequent years.81  In a report
to Congress, the Register of Copyrights stated that the renewal provi-
sion “has largely failed to accomplish its primary purpose” to protect
the author and his family against unprofitable or improvident disposi-
tions of copyright.82  “It has also been the source of more confusion
and litigation than any other provision in the copyright law.”83  Judi-
cial decisions in the intervening years characterized renewal as not
the property of the author’s estate, but rather a “new, personal grant
of a right.”84  Because the author could not assign his family’s renewal
interest, the renewal provision became “a compulsory bequest of the
copyright to the designated persons.”85  The Supreme Court also held
that an author could assign his renewal rights in advance, noting that
the legislative material revealed no intent to restrain authors’ ability
79. H.R. 28192, 60th Cong. § 23 (1909), in 6 1909 OMNIBUS, pt. S, at S36–S37.  The
final bill vested renewal in “the author of such work, if still living, or the widow,
widower, or children of the author if the author be not living, or if such author,
widow, widower or children be not living, then the author’s executors, or in the
absence of a will, his next of kin . . . .”  Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 § 23
(1909).  The provision dealing with subsisting copyrights used the same class of
successors. Id. § 24.  In her history of the renewal provision, Barbara Ringer
noted that the final bill was a “crude attempt” to graft portions of the earlier
legislation onto H.R. 22183.  1961 RENEWAL STUDY, supra note 78, at 122.
80. 1961 RENEWAL STUDY, supra note 78, at 122.
81. In hearings leading up to the 1976 Act, the Register of Copyrights noted that the
renewal provision had been fraught with difficulties, and had been “one of the few
instances in which the Supreme Court has been called upon to decide the mean-
ing of the word ‘or’ in a statute . . . .” Copyright Law Revision, Hearing on H.R.
4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835 Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1869 (1965) (statement by Abraham Kaminstein), in 7
1976 OMNIBUS 1869.
82. REG. OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON
THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 53 (Comm. Print 1961)
(printed for the use of the House Committee on the Judiciary), in 3 1976 OMNI-
BUS, pt. 1, at 53 [hereinafter REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS REPORT].
83. Id.
84. Ballentine v. De Sylva, 226 F.2d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 1955), aff’d 351 U.S. 570
(1956).
85. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 582 (1956).
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to assign.86  The Court later concluded that such an assignment was
valid provided the author was living at the time for renewal.87
1. Studies and Conferences on Revision
In 1961, the Copyright Office published a study of the renewal pro-
vision, part of a series of studies reexamining the copyright law.88
The renewal study characterized the statutory beneficiaries as Con-
gress’s chosen means to ensure that the renewal benefit went to the
natural objects of the author’s bounty.89  The general intention to ben-
efit authors and their survivors is apparent from the legislative his-
tory and the constitutional command.90  The intent underlying the use
of statutory successors rather than deferring to the author’s will is not
so clear.  The study goes on to state:
[S]omething more than a reversion to the author’s “executors, administrators,
or heirs” had to be provided.  If the renewal reverted to the author’s estate, it
was entirely possible that legatees and creditors might gain the benefits at the
expense of the author’s family and dependents.  Apparently in a deliberate
effort to avoid this result, Congress set up a schedule of successive classes of
persons who were entitled to take the renewal . . . .91
With all respect to the study’s esteemed author, there is no evidence of
“deliberate effort” in the legislative history of the statutory succes-
sors.92  Additionally, a purported desire to protect authors’ estates
from creditors seems decidedly paternalistic, and is at odds with the
report’s general conclusion that reversion is about bargaining power
86. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S 643, 655–56 (1943).
87. Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375 (1960).
88. 1961 RENEWAL STUDY, supra note 78, at III.
89. Id. at 125.
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o promote the
Progress of . . . the useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the
exclusive Rights to their . . . Writings . . . .”).  The theme of securing “to Authors
[and not publishers]” runs throughout the statements of authors’ representatives
in the 1976 and 1909 conferences.
91. 1961 RENEWAL STUDY, supra note 78, at 125; see also Pierre N. Leval & Lewis
Liman, Are Copyrights for Authors or Their Children?, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 1 (1991-1992) (examining whether a benefit to the author’s family is con-
sistent with the Copyright Clause).
92. The study cites a 1907 Senate Report in support of the proposition that Congress
wanted to benefit the author’s “dependent relatives.” 1961 RENEWAL STUDY,
supra note 78, at 125 (citing S. REP. NO. 59-6187, pt. 1, at 8 (1907)). When the
quoted phrase is read in full context, however, the intent is limited to extensions:
The bill follows the act of 1831 in permitting to existing copyrights the
benefit of the possible extension; as introduced, however, it limited the
privilege to cases where the author or his widow or children are still
living, whereas the act of 1831 extended it also to his heirs, executors, or
administrators (not, it will be observed, to his assigns).  The committee
believe [sic] that the limitation would discriminate unfairly against de-
pendent relatives of the author and recommend [sic] an amendment
which will include them to the same extent as by the act of 1831.
S. REP. NO. 59-6187, pt. 1, at 8 (emphasis added).
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and an asset that is difficult to value.93  Up until the hurried revisions
of late 1908 and early 1909, “renewal” was an issue only for existing
copyrights, and operated to extend them for the duration of the au-
thor’s life plus a term of years.94  Since authors may have planned
around the 1831 Act, and since the earlier bills contemplated a much
longer term probably not planned for by authors, a statutory class of
successors made sense.
When the life-plus term was abandoned, the class of individuals
entitled to exercise and benefit from the renewal right was, at best, an
assumption that authors would want their widows and children to
benefit.  Alternatively, it may reflect an unspoken congressional wish
that authors’ mistresses not benefit at the expense of wives.  Given the
extent of author involvement in the debate, it seems odd that nobody
ever sought more precision in the class of successors.  One possible
reason for this inattention is that until 1916, there was no permanent
estate tax,95 and thus no need to structure asset transfers around it.
In a 1961 Report with recommendations, the Register of Copy-
rights identified the difficulty the renewal scheme posed for estate
planners, noting that it “operate[d] to change the usual rules, under
State laws, of succession to a deceased person’s property.”96  Among
the arguments against the renewal-and-reversion system was the pro-
position that, “An author’s copyrights, like his other personal prop-
erty, should be subject to his bequest by will or, if he leaves no will,
should go to his heirs under the general law of intestate succession.”97
The Register’s recommendation was to abolish reversion, permit any
person claiming an interest in the copyright (author, executor, heir,
employer, assignee, etc.) to file for registration, and for the renewal to
extend all rights to the full term, for the benefit of anyone with an
interest in the copyright.98
To replace renewal and reversion and ameliorate the author’s in-
ferior bargaining position, the Register recommended placing a time
limit on transfers:
The statute should provide that any assignment by an author or his represen-
tative or heirs shall not be effective for more than 20 years from the date of its
93. See 1961 RENEWAL STUDY, supra note 78, at 125 (“It has often been said that the
renewal provision was based on the ‘familiar imprudence of authors in commer-
cial matters.’  While superficially logical, there is nothing in the legislative his-
tory that supports this supposition.  There is more evidence of a Congressional
recognition that author-publisher contracts must frequently be made when the
value of the work is unknown or conjectural and the author (regardless of his
business ability) is necessarily in a poor bargaining position.”).
94. See supra section III.A.
95. See Jeffrey A. Cooper, Ghosts of 1932: The Lost History of Estate and Gift Taxa-
tion, 9 FLA. TAX. REV. 875, 881–82 (2010).
96. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS REPORT, supra note 82, at 53.
97. Id. at 54.
98. Id. at 54, 92.
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execution, unless it provides for the continuing payment of royalties based on
the uses made of the work or the revenue derived from it.99
This recommendation proved to be “one of the two or three most con-
troversial recommendations in the entire Report.”100  Publishers dis-
puted the notion that authors were in a poor bargaining position and
argued for freedom of contract.101  Authors sought the best of both
worlds—having copyright treated like any other property, but still
subject to termination.102  Perhaps because of their experience with
the renewal reversion, authors recognized that if Congress used the
same statutory class of heirs for a termination interest, their ability to
plan property transfers would be limited.103  Authors’ representatives
argued that a particular author may have good reason to transfer
copyrights to those outside the statutory class of heirs—for example,
where the individual in the class is wealthy, but where other depen-
dents outside the class are in need.104
99. Id. at 94.
100. STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 277 (Comm.
Print 1964) (statement of Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register of Copyrights for
Examining), in 3 1976 OMNIBUS, pt. 3, at 277.
101. STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPY-
RIGHT LAW 104 (Comm. Print 1963), in 3 1976 OMNIBUS, pt. 2, at 104 (statement
of Joseph Dubin of Universal Pictures Co., Inc.) (“[T]his report states that the
poor author is in a bad bargaining position and everybody takes advantage of
him.  Whoever wrote that report never sat in on a negotiation to acquire rights
form an author because, first of all, he doesn’t deign to be present.  He’s too im-
portant.  But he comes represented by his agent, his agent’s attorney, his own
attorney, his business manager, and his tax adviser.  And on top of that, he is a
member of a collective bargaining unit who has protected him by a contract.”); id.
at 357 (letter from Edward Sarogy, counsel for the Copyright Committee of the
Motion Picture Association of America) (characterizing the proposed termination
provision as “[p]erhaps the most disturbing portions” of the Register’s proposal).
102. See id. at 104 (statement of Joseph Dubin) (responding to statements by Irwin
Karp of the Authors League of America and John Schulman of the American Pat-
ent Law Association Committee on Copyright).
103. See id. at 239 (letter from the American Guild of Authors and Composers) (“[I]t is
our recommendation that the author have full right to dispose of the renewal
interest or any reverted interest (as the case may be) and that such interest
should become part of his estate . . . . Statutory rigidity in this matter can thwart
the worthy desires of an author and the genuine needs of his depen-
dents. . . . Such statutory operation can also thwart an author in making the
presently prevalent arrangements to protect and enhance his estate, known as
estate planning.”).  Publishers also recognized the potential issues. See id. at 279
(letter from Joseph Dubin) (“The recommendations [regarding disposition of a re-
versionary interest], rather than assisting the author and his heirs, would seem
to militate against the possibility of any satisfactory arrangement being entered
into for the exploitation of the author’s work.”).
104. Id.; see also id. at 360 (statement from the Motion Picture Association of America)
(arguing for free transferability by inheritance or during life).
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2. Congressional Proceedings
The preliminary draft of the revision bill proposed two alternatives
for limitations on transfer of copyright ownership.105  Alternative A
limited transfers of exclusive rights to twenty-five years, with rights
reverting to the author or his legal representatives, legatees, or heirs
at law, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.106  Alterna-
tive B permitted an author to bring an action to reform or terminate a
transfer if, after twenty years, the compensation received by the au-
thor was “strikingly disproportionate” to the profits of the trans-
feree.107  Where an author was deceased, her legal representatives,
legatees, or heirs at law could exercise the right.108  The right came
with a limitations period of sorts, with filing required within three
years after the twenty-year period elapsed.109
Predictably, publishers opposed the notion of termination110 and
thus particularly disliked Alternative B.111  The termination right it-
self was so controversial that there was very little discussion of the
105. STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 15–16 (Comm.
Print 1964), in 3 1976 OMNIBUS, pt. 3, at 15–16.
106. Id. at 15–16.  This version of the termination right did not apply to works for hire
or transfers by will, and permitted the original transferee to continue to exploit
derivative works. Id.
107. Id. at 16.  Alternative B was patterned on a draft copyright law under considera-
tion in Germany. Id. at 278 (statement of Barbara Ringer).
108. Id. at 16.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 281 (statement of Richard Colby of the MPAA Copyright Committee)
(“We will oppose this provision and if it is to be included in the draft submitted to
the Congress, we must take the position that a bill should not pass with either of
these alternatives.”); id. at 281 (statement of Horace Manges of the American
Book Publishers Council) (“[E]ither one of these alternatives would be devastat-
ing insofar as they apply to book publishers.”); id. at 284 (statement of Philip
Wattenberg) (“[I]f [the termination section], in either of its present alternative
forms or substantially in any form, remains in the final draft, music publishers
will strongly oppose the entire revision draft.”); id. at pt. 3, 341 (comments of
Julian Abeles, American Textbook Publishers Institute) (“Publishers submit that
this provision is highly impractical and against public interest, as well as detri-
mental to the functions of the publishers and their incentive to publish needed
costly works.”).
111. Id. at 279 (statement of Richard Colby of the MPAA Copyright Committee)
(“[A]lternative B is so burdensome and mechanically complicated, that it should
not receive favorable consideration.  Indeed, I am a little surprised that it is put
forward even as an alternative provision since it can so upset business practice.”);
id. at 282 (statement of Horace Manges) (“[Alternative B] is a system for encour-
aging multitudinous litigation . . . .”); id. at 283 (statement of Julian Abeles) (“[Al-
ternative B] is contrary to every contractual and legal principle.  How can such a
provision be justified?”); id. at 292 (statement of A.H. Wasserstrom of the Maga-
zine Publishers Association Copyright Committee) (“[A]lternative B is an inex-
cusable litigation-breeder.”).
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manner in which the beneficiary clause was drafted.112  The subse-
quent revision bill did away with automatic termination and instead
required notice by “the author who executed [the transfer] or, if he is
dead, by his legal representatives, legatees, or heirs . . . notwithstand-
ing any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a
will or to make any other future transfer.”113  No termination right
was available for works made for hire, or with respect to transfers by
will.114  While opposition to termination as a whole remained,115 au-
thors viewed the provision as “a compromise of a very difficult and
bitter problem.”116
Bella Linden, commenting on behalf of the American Textbook
Publishers Institute and as a lawyer for authors, remarked that the
revised version created “a system under which we would have the
complicated problem of who owns what at the end of 35 years.”117  Be-
cause the draft class was not limited to the widow, widower, or chil-
dren, it introduced the complication of next of kin, administrators, and
other collateral relatives.118  Others speaking for publishers begged
the drafters to “preserve the reversion concept” (presumably the statu-
tory class of successors) as it existed in the law in force.119  Perhaps
seeking certainty, publishers argued that if the purpose of termina-
tion was to protect an author’s widow and children against the im-
providence of the author, allowing termination by “legal
representatives, legatees, or heirs” defeated that purpose.120  Publish-
ers favored “the widow, widower, and children of the author, provided
112. A single commenter (and lawyer), A.H. Wasserstrom of the Magazine Publishers
Association, suggested that as a matter of draftsmanship, “distributees” would be
a better term than “legatees” or “heirs at law.” Id. at 293.
113. STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1964 REVISION BILL WITH
DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS 10 (Comm. Print 1965) (§ 17 of draft bill), in 4 1976
OMNIBUS, pt. 5, at 10.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 154 (statement of Philip Wattenberg on behalf of the Music Publishers As-
sociation) (“I am fully in accord with the many previous arguments in favor of
deleting the reversion provision.”); id. at 156 (statement of Horace Manges on
behalf of the American Book Publishers Council) (“[W]hile section 16 as now writ-
ten is a decided improvement over what it was in the draft, it is still intolera-
ble.”); id. at 160 (statement of Robert Evans, on behalf of Columbia Broadcasting
System) (“[I]t’s very difficult to say anything good about section 16.  I think at
best it’s an extreme case of misguided paternalism; at worst, it’s a reflection of
the philosophy which someone in public life has, in another context, called ‘no
win.’”).
116. Id. at 156 (statement of Irwin Karp on behalf of the Authors League of America).
E. Gabriel Perle, representing Time, Inc., characterized the revision as “a com-
promise that is going to make nobody happy.” Id. at 165.
117. Id. at 165.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 225–26 (letter from the American Book Publishers Council, Inc. and Ameri-
can Book Publishers Institute) (requesting changes in the draft revision bill).  As
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they or any of them are the copyright owners.”121  Having framed
their appeal for a termination right as motivated by a desire to benefit
their families, authors were hardly in a position to argue that they
should be also able to use termination to benefit paramours122 and
private foundations.123
The Register’s 1965 Supplementary Report acknowledged that the
termination provision was “the most explosive and difficult issue” in
the drafting phase.124  Notwithstanding the opposition, the Copyright
Office “remained firmly committed to the general principle of rever-
sion,” but sought to structure the provision “to be of practical benefit
to authors and their families without being unfair to publishers, film
producers, and other users.”125  The Register explained that the draft-
ers used a class of statutory successors to provide “a clearer, more de-
terminate class of beneficiaries consisting of the author’s immediate
family.”126  Though there is scant support for such a congressional
purpose in the legislative history, the Register also justified statutory
successors as a mechanism “to keep the right of reversion out of the
author’s estate so that it would not be subject to the claims of
creditors.”127
By 1965, the termination provision had assumed the basic form it
would eventually take under the 1976 Act.  Grants were terminable
for a five-year window, beginning thirty-five years from the date of the
grant.128  Termination would not be automatic, but instead required
the author or her statutory successors to file notice.129  Grants were
terminable by the author, the surviving widow (or widower) and chil-
dren, or the children of any dead child.130  Generally, authors ap-
discussed in subsection III.C.1, supra, this is a questionable proposition, at least
in the Register’s view. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
121. Id.
122. Larry Spier, Inc. v. Bourne Co., 953 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir. 1992) (involving a case
where composer Dave Dreyer created a testamentary trust, under which income
was to be paid to “Anna (Dreyer’s wife), Lewis (Dreyer’s son), Marie (Dreyer’s
daughter) and Mynna Granat (Dreyer’s mistress)”).
123. Saroyan v. William Saroyan Found., 675 F. Supp. 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (‘Saroyan
willed certain real property and $150,000 to his children and sister.  The rest of
his estate, including ‘all copyrights, rights to copyright and literary property in
published or unpublished work,’ was left to defendant William Saroyan
Foundation . . . .”).
124. STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPY-
RIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 71 (Comm. Print 1965) (§ 14 of draft bill), in 4
1976 OMNIBUS, pt. 6, at 71.
125. Id. at 72.
126. Id. at 73.
127. Id.
128. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong. § 203(a) (1965).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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proved of the provision, and publishers at least accepted it as a
reasonable131 and preferable alternative to the renewal system.132
Authors and publishers jointly requested that successor rights to ter-
minate and negotiate new grants be exercisable by a majority, rather
than unanimously.133  Having arrived at a perhaps delicate compro-
mise, commenters urged the Committee to leave the termination pro-
vision alone.134  The subsequent Senate bill clarified the rights held
by a surviving spouse and children, and adopted the recommendation
that termination be exercised by a majority vote.135  The House Com-
mittee, after spending “a good deal of time” on the question of unanim-
ity, adopted a provision similar to the Senate’s.136  This provision was
retained in the final 1976 Act, and the record reflects no further dis-
cussion of statutory successors.137
131. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearing on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R.
6835 Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 107
(1965) (statement of Irwin Karp, Authors League of America) (“We are happy to
report that the Authors League has reached an accord [on termination] with vari-
ous users’ organizations, with the American Textbook Publishers Institute, [and]
with the American Book Publishers Council.  I understand that certain organiza-
tions of music publishers find also find acceptable the proposals in the
bill . . . . There are one or two industry groups that are still opposed to the
clause . . . . We hope that they will see the light of reason . . . .”), in 5 1976
OMNIBUS, Pt. 1, at 108; id. at 129 (statement of Horace S. Manges, American
Book Publishers Council) (“Although still [opposing termination], we, neverthe-
less, compromised with authors in the spirit of harmony.  Thus, based on the
agreement of the Authors League to certain recommended changes, we are not
opposing the reversion provision.”). But see id. at 159 (statement of the Magazine
Publishers Association, Inc.) (arguing the termination provision is “wrong in
principle” and that “[t]here appears no sufficient reason for treating an author as
the feckless ‘darling’ of the law, one who must be saved from the consequences of
his own jural acts”).  The Composers and Lyricists Guild of America’s opposition
to the termination provision stemmed from its exclusion of works for hire. Id. at
264 (statement of Leonard Zissu on behalf of the Guild).
132. Id. at 149 (supplemental statement of American Book Publishers Council) (“We
are vigorously opposed to any renewal system.  Our acceptance of a proposed
term of life plus 50 years was predicated on the very fact that it is a single contin-
uous term, not requiring any renewal . . . .”).
133. See id. at 129–30 (recommendation of the American Publishers council).  Profes-
sor Nimmer shared their concerns. Id. at 1816 (statement of Melville B. Nimmer)
(“I can envisage—and I am sure I am not alone in that—problems there, where
one out of several claimants, for reasons good or otherwise, refrains from joining
in the request for reversion.”), in 7 1976 OMNIBUS 1816.
134. See id. (statement of Joseph Dubin, American Patent Law Association)  (“In the
interest of obtaining a workable copyright revision law, I urge that the provisions
covering ‘recapture’ should be left untouched.”), in 7 1976 OMNIBUS 1537–38.
135. S. 597, 90th Cong. § 203 (1967), in 9 1976 OMNIBUS 15–16.
136. H.R. REP. NO. 89–2237, 119–224 (1966).
137. See Copyright Law Revision, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trade-
marks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 74 (1967)
(statement of Horace Manges, American Book Publishers Council, Inc.) (explain-
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Sections 203(a)(2)(D) and 304 (c)(2)(D), which provide that in the
absence of a surviving spouse or children, an “author’s executor, ad-
ministrator, personal representative, or trustee” own the entire termi-
nation interest, were added by the 1998 Copyright Term Extension
Act.138  The legislative history sheds no light on what prompted the
addition.139
IV. A MORE SENSIBLE SUCCESSION
Given the explosive nature of the debate over the termination
right, Congress, authors, and publishers may shy away from any fu-
ture revision rather than risk upsetting the compromise.  However, if
the termination provision proves as frustrating to authors and pub-
lishers as the renewal provision, Congress could, by making modest
changes, make the termination right less of a trap for the unwary
planner.  This Part examines the problems planners face because of
termination, reasons for favoring an author’s chosen beneficiaries over
a statutory class of successors, and then suggests changes to the stat-
ute to bring about that result.
ing that termination receded as an issue because of the compromise between au-
thors and publishers), in 9 1976 OMNIBUS 74.
138. Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298 § 2, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
139. H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, 8 (1998) (explaining, simply, “This section amends Sec-
tions 203(a)(2) and 304(c)(2) by allowing an author’s executor to receive his entire
termination interest in the event that the author’s widow, widower, children, or
grandchildren are not living, or in the absence of a will, the author’s next of kin
shall own the author’s entire termination interest.”).  References to termination
in committee hearings expressed termination as a preferable alternative to vest-
ing an extended term in heirs automatically. See, e.g., The Copyright Term Ex-
tension Act of 1995: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
(1995), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/2DST-4RZQ (statement of Pat Alger,
Nashville Songwriters Association International) (“It has been suggested that the
bill be further amended to vest the proposed extra 20 years of copyright protec-
tion automatically in authors or their heirs.  Instead, NSAI would rather rely on
the termination of transfer provisions as currently guaranteed in Sections 203
and 304 of the Copyright Act to protect its members, ability to recapture their
copyrighted works.  To this end, NSAI continues to actively educate its member-
ship concerning those rights.”); id., archived at http://perma.unl.edu/4W28-RBQ5
(statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (noting the consensus
that the term extension should benefit “authors and their heirs” and favoring
termination as the mechanism). But see id., archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
9B94-8TPZ (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi, Washington College of Law,
American University) (arguing against term extension, generally, but suggesting
that an extended term should vest automatically in authors and their heirs); id.,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/JQ2B-UFQ7 (statement of Dennis Karjala, Pro-
fessor of Law, Arizona State University)  (“If sustenance, to two generations of
authorial descendants is really the goal, we should be considering prohibitions on
transfers and/or stronger termination rights rather than a longer term of
protection.”).
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A. Termination as a Planning Challenge
Estate planning addresses two intertwined concerns: achieving the
client’s wishes with regard to property distribution, and doing so in a
tax-efficient manner.  For most people, property distribution is the
main concern; fewer than one percent of adult deaths result in pay-
ment of estate taxes.140  So, though the termination interest poses
some interesting tax questions,141 its more troubling effect is the un-
certainty it introduces into property transfers.
To illustrate the uncertainty suppose that, like Albert Brumley, an
author makes a lifetime transfer of copyright.  This is a common es-
tate planning technique because even where taxation is not a concern,
a donor may want to transfer control over an asset before death.142
Because it is a grant by the author other than by will, the grant will be
subject to termination thirty-five years after it is made.143  If the au-
thor dies before the termination window closes, the statutory succes-
sors will have the ability to terminate the grant.144  The terminated
rights go to those in the statutory class,145 rather than the author’s
intended recipient (who may or may not be a member of the class).
Because nobody knows who will survive until the termination window
opens or closes, ownership of the rights under the grant is inherently
uncertain.  Even if the author wanted to obtain an agreement from all
potential statutory successors, the statute prevents her from doing so.
The termination interest passes to the statutory class, “notwithstand-
ing any agreement to the contrary.”146
Not only is this uncertainty troublesome for planners, it is at odds
with the general preference in American property law for the ability to
freely dispose of transfers with certainty, as discussed below.
140. See Brian Raub & Joseph Newcomb, Internal Revenue Serv., Federal Estate Tax
Returns Filed for 2007 Decedents, STATS. OF INCOME BULL., Summer 2011, at 182
(noting that in 2007, estate tax returns were filed only or 1.5% of all adult deaths,
and that of those returns, slightly less than half resulted in payment of estate
tax), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/RK2E-LDWZ.  In 2015, the unified credit
against estate tax exempted from taxation the first $5.43 million of an individ-
ual’s estate; a married couple can shelter twice that amount.  Rev. Proc. 2014–61,
2014–47 I.R.B. 19.
141. See infra note 170.  One possible reason is that if copyrights are inherently diffi-
cult to value, contingent ownership of a right to terminate a grant of copyright—
which may or may not be exercisable depending on who survives for how long—is
more difficult still.
142. See Alexander & Klemmer, supra note 2.
143. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012).
144. Id. § 203(a)(2).
145. Id. § 203(b).
146. Id. § 203(a)(5).
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B. The Preference for Testamentary Freedom
The law of property succession in America is organized around the
principle that a person may dispose of her property as she chooses.147
State succession laws generally “facilitate rather than regulate” prop-
erty transfers.148  For example, when interpreting donative instru-
ments, a court’s first consideration is the intention of the donor.149
The justifications for freedom of testation go beyond donor satisfac-
tion, however.  It is thought to serve a number of social goals, includ-
ing achieving a socially optimal distribution of property,150 because
donors have better information about the needs of their families and
other donees than courts or legislatures.  As a result, they are in the
best position to allocate the donated resources.151
When a legislature or a court restricts testamentary freedom, it
generally does so because in certain circumstances, complete freedom
produces a socially undesirable result.152  For example, in most states,
a testator may not completely disinherit her surviving spouse because
in some cases, this would result in the surviving spouse becoming de-
pendent on the state for support.  In economic terms, a disinherited
spouse is a potential negative externality resulting from unfettered
testamentary freedom.153  Most state legislatures have responded by
giving the surviving spouse election to take under the terms of a will
or take a fixed fraction of the estate.154
147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. a (2003).
148. Id., cmt. c.
149. See, e.g., Thorson v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 274 Neb. 329, 332, 740
N.W.2d 27, 33 (2007).
150. Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justi-
fications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1136 (2013).
151. Id.
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. c (“Among the rules of law that prohibit or restrict freedom of disposition in
certain instances are those relating to spousal rights; creditors’ rights; unreason-
able restraints on alienation or marriage; provisions promoting separation or di-
vorce; impermissible racial or other categoric restrictions; provisions encouraging
illegal activity; and the rules against perpetuities and accumulations.”).
153. See Kelly, supra note 150, at 1161 (discussing disinheritance of minor children as
a negative externality).
154. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2313 (Reissue 2012).  Nebraska is one of more than
a dozen states that have adopted a version of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC).
See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uni-
form Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 891, 896–901 (1992) (discussing the develop-
ment and adoption of the UPC).  Even where it has not been adopted in its
entirety, many states have adopted at least part of it, and it reflects the modern
rules governing estates. Id. at 900–01.  Because of the influence and acceptance
of the UPC, this analysis uses Nebraska’s version as a stand-in for basic princi-
ples governing the distribution of a decedent’s property.
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Is there a defensible justification for Congress’s interference with
testamentary freedom through forced succession to the termination
interest?  At best, the negative externality justification provides weak
support for the use of statutory successors to termination.  State elec-
tive share laws apply to the decedent’s entire estate.155  An elective
share provision is an efficient solution to the negative externality in
that context because an omitted spouse has been deprived of any bene-
fit from the estate.  The termination succession provision, however,
applies only to copyright assets and only to those subject to a grant by
the author.  Moreover, the state’s interest in creating forced shares is
preventing a state-dependent spouse.  The federal interest is—at least
in theory—providing an incentive to the author.  Restricting the au-
thor’s ability to transfer the property she creates can hardly be said to
be an incentive.  Any negative created by an author who disinherits
her surviving spouse of the termination interest is not really a matter
of federal concern, and to the extent it is, state law has already devel-
oped a solution.
Another argument marshaled for restrictions on testamentary
freedom is that in making a will, the testator is necessarily operating
with imperfect information.156  In the case of the termination right,
the most obvious missing information is the value of the copyright in-
terest covered by a grant.  As the legislative history makes clear, the
difficulty of valuing copyright assets is one of the justifications for the
termination interest.157  While better information about the value of a
copyright could conceivably change an author’s choices about who has
the ability to terminate a grant, it does not follow that a class of suc-
cessors is a solution to the problem.  The imperfect information prob-
lem is usually addressed through judicial intervention by modifying or
interpreting the terms of an individual will or trust to give effect to a
donor’s intent in the event of unforeseen circumstances.158  By apply-
ing the same inflexible succession scheme to all grants and frustrating
most transfers, Congress has arguably frustrated the state law solu-
tion to the imperfect information problem.
The final justification for restraints on testamentary freedom is
that the living—not the dead—have the greatest incentive to effi-
ciently manage property.159  Here, too, the congressional choice falls
short of a solution.  Even where it is economically efficient to termi-
nate an existing grant, the interest may be split between a surviving
155. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2314 (Reissue 2012) (including in the augmented
estate the testamentary estate plus nontestamentary transfers).
156. Kelly, supra note 150, at 1158.
157. See supra Part III.
158. Kelly, supra note 150, at 1158–60.
159. Id. at 1164.
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spouse, children, and grandchildren.160  The Brumley litigation is il-
lustrative: the dispute involved two of the author’s surviving children,
the surviving spouses of two of his children, and the four of the au-
thor’s grandchildren.161  As the protracted proceeding in Brumley il-
lustrated, fractionalizing the termination right makes it more difficult
to manage it efficiently.  To the extent Congress may have sought to
use statutory successors to promote efficient management by the liv-
ing, its chosen mechanism is demonstrably ineffective.
C. Two Statutory Solutions
The 94th Congress no doubt had the best of intentions when it
passed the termination provisions of the 1976 Act, dividing the termi-
nation right of a deceased author.  For the reasons discussed in the
previous section, however, the author is in the best position to under-
stand her survivors’ needs and provide for them accordingly.  An au-
thor may have two spendthrift children and one prudent one, or one
wealthy child and one of more limited financial success.  More plausi-
bly, an author may want to pass along her estate in a way that pre-
serves family harmony and limits squabbling among survivors.162  If
anything, forced succession invites more squabbling—the Brumley lit-
igation spanned nearly eight years163 and no doubt resulted in the
kind of family discord that Albert Brumley hoped to avoid.
Two modest changes to the termination statutes could give authors
greater freedom in planning the disposition of property and make
transfers more certain.
1. Reorder Statutory Successors
A modest revision to § 203(a)(2) and § 304(c)(2) could benefit au-
thors by allowing them to more effectively plan the disposition of their
estates, and publishers by eliminating the need to locate and negotiate
with surviving children and grandchildren.164  If the executor is first
160. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2) (2012).
161. Brumley v. Alfred E. Brumley & Sons, Inc. 727 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2013).
162. For a discussion of how thoughtful estate planning can nip potential conflicts in
the bud, see Timothy P. O’Sullivan, Family Harmony: An All Too Frequent Casu-
alty of the Estate Planning Process, 8 MARQ. ELDER ADVISOR 255 (2007).
163. Docket Report, Brumley v. Albert E. Brumley & Sons, No. 3:08-CV-01193 (M.D.
Tenn. July 9, 2010).
164. Though this reform would have the effect of depriving statutory successors of a
termination interest and thus raise a possible Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
issue, claims on that basis are unlikely to succeed.  Termination interests are
personal, not assignable, contingent, and the subject of investment-backed expec-
tations.  Note, Copyright Reform and the Takings Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV. 973,
992–93 (2015).
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in the class of statutory successors, publishers need only locate one
individual.165  The provision below is offered as a starting point:
(2) Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is
owned, and may be exercised, as follows:
(A) If the author has left a will, the executor166 holds the en-
tire termination interest and may exercise the interest if it
is consistent with the terms of the author’s will and in the
best interest of the beneficiaries of the author’s will.  If an
author’s will appoints an executor or executors for the ex-
press purpose of managing the author’s copyrights, such
executor or executors shall hold the entire termination
interest.
(B) If the author has not left a will, the author’s personal rep-
resentative167 shall hold the entire termination interest for
the benefit of the author’s heirs, as determined pursuant to
the intestacy laws of the author’s domicile on the date of
the author’s death.
(C) If an executor or personal administrator has been ap-
pointed but discharged, a successor appointed under state
law shall hold the entire interest.  If state law does not al-
low for appointment of a successor, the holder of the termi-
nation interest shall be determined according to (D), below.
(D) If an author has left no will, and if no person is authorized
or appointed to distribute the author’s estate, the termina-
tion interest shall be divided among the author’s intestate
heirs pursuant to the intestacy laws of the State of the au-
thor’s domicile on the date of the author’s death.168
165. See Tim Matson & Scott Nelson, Estate Planning for the Entertainer or Athlete,
ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Summer 2011, at 24, 25 (suggesting that planners and their
clients develop instructions for beneficiaries on whether and how to dispose of
intellectual property).
166. To ensure consistency, it is advisable to define “executor” in § 101 as “any person
appointed by a testator to carry out the terms of a will.”  This is because not all
states use the term “executor” to refer to the person appointed by the testator to
distribute the estate according to the terms of the will. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 30–2209(33) (Reissue 2012) (denominating such persons as “personal represen-
tative”).  In most states, applications for formal or informal probate are matters
of public record and must identify an executor or personal representative. See,
e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30–2414, 30–2426 (Reissue 2012).
167. For reasons similar to those identified in the preceding note, it is advisable to
define “personal representative” in § 101 as “a person authorized pursuant to the
law of the State of the author’s domicile at the author’s death to distribute the
author’s intestate estate.”
168. This provision is included as a fail-safe to provide some guidance in the event the
author’s survivors elect not to pursue formal or informal probate proceedings.
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To the extent Congress might intend to put the termination interest
beyond the reach of claimants against the estate,169 the proposed revi-
sion retains the structure of the prior provision and passes the termi-
nation interest outside of the author’s estate.170  In addition to
identifying for publishers one holder whose identity is a matter of pub-
lic record,171 giving the author’s executor priority among statutory
successors gives the author a measure of dead-hand control.  Because
the executor is bound by fiduciary obligation to act according to the
terms of the decedent’s will and in the best interests of successors to
the estate,172 the author has some assurance that her wishes regard-
ing intellectual property, as expressed in her will, will be respected.
Because termination notices cannot be served until twenty-five
years following a grant at the earliest, vesting the renewal interest in
the executor may mean that by the time the termination window has
169. Though this is recited as one of Congress’s goals in passing the termination inter-
est to statutory successors, there is no convincing support for it in the legislative
history.  If the rationale is really about giving authors the opportunity to renego-
tiate (rather than creating a paternalistic protection), why protect them from
creditors?
170. Whether or not termination is in the estate, the termination interest may (at
least, conceptually) result in transfer tax liability. See Crawford & Gans, supra
note 8 (exploring potential arguments for taxation of termination interests).
However, the I.R.S. has not acknowledged the existence of the termination right
in any published guidance. Id. at 74.  This is perhaps because the Service views
copyrights and patents as “similar in substance,” notwithstanding the absence of
a termination right in patents. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26 (“Since
the property rights of patents and copyrights are similar in substance, it is con-
cluded that the Service should adopt, in the case of copyrights, the position that is
being taken in the case of patents.”).  For purposes of categorizing income, a
“sale” of copyright occurs upon the grant of exclusive right to exploit the work in a
medium of publication throughout the life of the copyright.  I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,252 (July 3, 1984) (citing Rev. Rul. 54-409, 1954-2 C.B. 174).  A pre-1978
Revenue Ruling found a sale notwithstanding a contractual termination provi-
sion because the availability was conditioned upon “a future event not under the
control of the transferor.”  Rev. Rul. 75-202, 1975-1 C.B. 170.  How this ruling
would interact with a termination interest is unclear.  The facts of the ruling
recite that the transferor could terminate the agreement if the publisher failed to
keep the work in print for more than a year, or failed to publish the work in three
years. Id.  Presumably, if the transferor died six months after making the trans-
fer, her rights under the contract would be exercisable by her estate.  In contrast,
unless a transferor of copyright leaves no surviving spouse or children, her execu-
tor (but note, not her estate) has no ability to exercise the termination right.
171. See supra note 166.
172. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30–2464(a) (Reissue 2012) (“A personal representative is a fi-
duciary who shall [prudently manage the assets of the estate].  A personal repre-
sentative is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the terms of any probated and effective will and this code, and as
expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate.
He or she shall use the authority conferred upon him or her by this code, the
terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings to which he or she is party
for the best interests of successors to the estate.”).
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opened, the executor has been discharged.  One possible conclusion is
that in such situations, nobody holds a termination interest.173  Provi-
sion (C) is intended to address this situation, and reflects the fact that
many states have come up with a similar solution, and allow estates to
be re-opened and a new personal representative appointed when new
property is discovered.174  Congress could handle this by allowing for
appointment of an administrator to stand in the executor’s place.175
As a best practice, authors’ plans should include appointment of a lit-
erary executor to handle long-term management of intellectual
property.176
This proposal leaves open the possibility that a profligate author
will not name her surviving spouse or children (or either) as benefi-
ciaries of the will, depriving them of a termination interest.  If Con-
gress wants to avoid that result,177 the cleanest way to achieve it is to
173. See 3-9 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.04[B]
(2015) (discussing the problem in the context of renewal).
174. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-24,122 (Reissue 2012) (“If other property of the
estate is discovered after an estate has been settled and the personal representa-
tive discharged or his appointment terminated, the court upon petition of any
interested person and upon notice may appoint the same or a successor personal
representative to administer the subsequently discovered estate.”).
175. Id.
176. See Cheryl E. Hader, Making the Intangible Tangible: Planning for Intellectual
Property, 29 ESTATE PLANNING 574, 575–76 (2002) (suggesting that authors or
artists designate literary executors to manage copyrights, and that literary exec-
utors should be named and qualify as court-appointed executors in order to have
legal authority to engage in transactions regarding copyrights).  Hader also notes
that uniting management and control of creative assets is “essential” to maximiz-
ing their value. Id.  Where an author wants copyrights to benefit multiple dis-
tributees, transfer to a trust, corporation, or other entity prevents fragmentation
of control. See Richard E. Halperin, Vehicles for Artists’ Holding and Transfer-
ring of Copyrights, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 435, 440–41 (1998) (discussing
the risks of fragmentation of copyright).
177. See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Judicial Resistance to Copyright Law’s
Inalienable Right to Terminate, 33 COLUM. J.L. ARTS. 227 (2010) (criticizing Pen-
guin Group (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 200–04 (2d Cir. 2008) and
Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1043–47 (9th Cir.
2005), in which the courts’ interpretation of the law had the result of consistency
with the author’s estate plan, as judicial overstep of the inalienable character of
the termination interest).  Quaere, though, whether forced succession really
aligns with the author-incentive theory of copyright.  Though some commentators
appear to have an inherent suspicion of a second spouse, perhaps benefitting that
second spouse, even at the expense of surviving children, is the optimal incentive
for an author. Compare id. at 237 (“Rather than bequeath their copyright royal-
ties by will to their surviving family members, authors at times designate a fa-
vored charity, a mistress, or a testamentary trust to act for the benefit of
numerous interests.”), with Leval & Liman, supra note 91, at 9 (“Had the provi-
sion for statutory successor [in the 1909 Act] been understood to function only in
the absence of . . . devise by the author, it might be defended as an intestacy
provision governing property consigned to the power of Congress, functioning
where the author had failed to provide for the renewal term. . . . As the section
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make the termination right part of the author’s estate178 and subject
it to the restraints of state law, which are well-understood by estate
planners and courts alike.179  Though some commenters fear that this
would result in assignment of termination rights,180 that result is not
inevitable, particularly if agreements to make a will remain unen-
forceable as applied to copyrights.181  Though the law of testate and
intestate succession is not uniform from state to state,182 it is familiar
and generally well developed, in contrast to the confusion surrounding
the current statutory succession scheme and the taxation of the termi-
nation interest.183  Federal courts faced with a dispute over termina-
tion should have no more difficulty applying state succession laws
than any other body of state law.
2. Exempt Certain Lifetime Transfers
Whether or not Congress chooses to tinker with the order of the
class of successors, it could expand authors’ planning options by ex-
cluding certain lifetime transfers from termination.  Presently, only
was interpreted, however, it cannot benefit from that justification, for the succes-
sor’s rights will prevail over those arising from the author’s . . . will.”).
178. To achieve this result, the proposed revision to 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) would need
to be modified:
(2) Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is owned by
his or her estate.
The effect is to treat a termination interest like any other property, leaving an
author free to plan for its transfer.
179. See Francis M. Nevins, Jr., Copyright Law vs. Testamentary Freedom: The Sound
of a Collision Unheard, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 47, 47 (1988).  Most states
allow a surviving spouse omitted from a will to receive a portion of the estate.
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 30–2320 ((“If a testator fails to provide by will for his
surviving spouse who married the testator after the execution of the will, the
omitted spouse shall receive the same share of the estate he would have received
if the decedent left no will . . . .”).
180. Brad A. Greenberg, DOMA’s Ghost and Copyright Reversionary Interests, 108
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 102, 107 (2013) (exploring whether a same-sex spouse
would be recognized as a statutory survivor in states not recognizing same-sex
marriage, and noting that though giving authors testamentary freedom might
seem a simple solution, it would make assignment of termination rights
“inevitable”).
181. 17 U.S.C. §§ 204(a)(5), § 304(c)(5) (2012) (“Termination of the grant may be ef-
fected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to
make a will or to make any future grant.” (emphasis added)).
182. See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uni-
form Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 891, 895 (1992) (citing the lack of uniformity
as a source of frustration).
183. At least conceptually, the termination interest may result in transfer tax liabil-
ity. See Crawford & Gans, supra note 8 (exploring potential arguments for taxa-
tion of termination interests), and discussion supra note 170.
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transfers by will are excluded from termination.184  Modern estate
and tax planning frequently uses tools that require lifetime (rather
than testamentary) transfers.185  Because these transfers do not in-
volve the same poor bargaining position that drove Congress to create
the termination right, they should be exempted from termination.
There are at least three categories of lifetime transfers that could be
excluded: gifts to individuals, charitable gifts, and transfers to busi-
ness entities owned by the author.  Making annual gifts of property is
a commonly used way to reduce the amount of a client’s taxable estate
without incurring transfer tax.186  In the absence of fraud, duress, or
other over-reaching conduct, there is no reason to believe that Con-
gress intended to protect an author against gratuitous transfers.  A
gift may turn out to be improvident, but not because an author has a
poor bargaining position relative to a publisher.  The same rationale
supports an exemption for transfers to charitable organizations.
Where an author transfers copyright to an entity completely owned by
the author, there is likewise no basis to be concerned about the au-
thor’s poor bargaining position, or about the difficulty of valuing the
copyright, since the author ultimately retains control over it.
V. PLANNING & TERMINATION
Unless and until Congress decides to revisit the third rail of copy-
right, estate planners whose clients’ assets include copyright have to
advise their clients of the right’s existence, and to the extent they can,
plan around it.  This Part explores options and considerations for
planners dealing with copyright, focusing on property transfers using
common estate planning techniques.187
A. Is Termination a Concern?
Under the terms of the statute, termination provisions do not ap-
ply to certain grants or to certain types of works.  Under any of the
termination provisions, grants made by will are not subject to termi-
nation188 and termination is unavailable if the work is a work made
184. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012) (“[T]he exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or
license of copyright or of any right under a copyright . . . otherwise than by will, is
subject to termination . . . .”).
185. See Alexander & Klemmer, supra note 2.
186. See infra note 228.
187. Those interested in the details of how intellectual property transactions are taxed
should refer to JEFFREY A. MAINE & XUAN-THAO N. NGUYEN, INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY TAXATION (2015).  For questions on taxation of the termination interest it-
self, see Crawford & Gans, supra note 8.
188. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c), 304(d) (2012).
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for hire.189  Grants that, by their own terms, expire within thirty-five
years are also not subject to termination.  Grants made after January
1, 1978, are only subject to termination if they are “executed by the
author.”190  Grants made before January 1, 1978, are subject to termi-
nation by the author or statutory successors if made by the author.191
Pre-1978 grants made by persons other than the author are subject to
termination only by the surviving person or persons who executed the
grant.192
Even if a work is not a work made for hire, and even if the grant is
subject to termination, termination is not a concern if the time to
serve notice has elapsed.  For post-1978 works generally, termination
may take effect at any time during a five-year period, beginning
thirty-five years from the date the grant was executed.193  If the grant
covers the right of publication, the five-year period begins at the ear-
lier of thirty-five years after publication of the work under the grant,
or forty years after the date of execution of the grant.194  Notice stat-
ing an effective date within the appropriate window must be served at
least two but not more than ten years before the effective date.195  Ac-
cordingly, for grants other than the right of publication, notice will be
ineffective to terminate the grant if it is served more than thirty-eight
years after the date the grant was executed.  For a grant involving the
right to publication, notice must be served by the earlier of thirty-
eight years from the date of publication or forty-three years from the
date the grant was executed.
For pre-1978 grants, there are potentially two opportunities to ter-
minate.  Under § 304(c), termination may take effect during a period
of five years beginning fifty-six years after the date copyright was
originally secured.196  Notice must be served at least two but not more
than ten years before the termination takes effect,197 so this means
the latest the notice can be served for a § 304(c) termination is fifty-
nine years after the date copyright was secured.  If a work was in its
renewal term on October 27, 1998198 (the effective date of the Sonny
189. See id. (each addressing “other than a work made for hire”).  For an overview of
works made for hire in copyright law, see generally 1-5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 173, § 5.03.
190. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a).
191. Id. § 304(c).
192. Id. § 304(c)(1) (“In the case of a grant executed by a person or persons other than
the author, termination of the grant may be effected by the surviving person or
persons who executed it.”).
193. Id. § 203(a)(3).
194. Id.
195. Id. § 203(a)(4)(A).
196. Id. § 304(c)(3).
197. Id. § 304(c)(4)A).
198. The most recent work that could possibly be in its renewal term on October 27,
1998, is one for which copyright was originally secured on December 31, 1969.
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Bono Copyright Term Extension Act),199 and if the § 304(c) termina-
tion right has not been exercised, the grantor has a second chance to
terminate under § 304(d).  Termination may take effect at any point in
a five-year window beginning seventy-five years from the date copy-
right was originally secured200 and the same notice rules apply.  Ac-
cordingly, the latest notice can be served is during the seventy-eighth
year after the grant.201
If a grant is subject to termination, the statute permits authors (or
successors) to make a new grant after the effective date of termina-
tion.202  Appellate decisions also suggest that an author can “restart
the clock” by contractually terminating and superseding a prior grant
while the termination window is open.203  The courts in each of these
cases reasoned that Congress surely anticipated the possibility for re-
negotiation through contract rather than statutory termination, and
that such contractual renegotiations should not be treated as “agree-
ments to the contrary” (and thus ineffective under the Act).204  If rene-
gotiation (rather than protection from alienation) is the basis for
termination, this result makes sense, though it is not without its
critics.205
B. Transfer by Will
The simplest way for an author to ensure that her copyrights go to
particular individual upon her death is to transfer the copyrights by
will, because transfers by will are not subject to termination.206  Of
Under the 1976 Act, copyright terms run to the end of the calendar year in which
they would otherwise expire. Id. § 305 (1976).  Accordingly, to be covered by
§ 304(d), the first twenty-eight-year term must end before calendar year 1998.
The earliest work that could possibly be in its renewal term on October 27, 1998,
is one for which copyright was originally secured on January 1, 1923.  There is no
calendar-year provision in the 1909 Act, so the first term would run until Janu-
ary 1, 1951.  Assuming copyright was renewed, the original forty-seven-year re-
newal term would have still been in effect on October 27, 1998.
199. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105–298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
200. 17 U.S.C. § 304(d)(2).
201. This means that as of this writing, 1936 and earlier grants are not terminable.
202. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(3)–(4) (2012), 304(c)(5)(C)–(D).
203. Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 200–04 (2d Cir. 2008);
Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1043–47 (9th Cir.
2005).
204. Penguin Group, 537 F.3d at 202–04; Milne, 430 F.3d at 1045–46.
205. See, e.g., Menell & Nimmer, supra note 177.
206. Under the 1909 Act, the renewal-and-reversion scheme had the potential to dis-
place an author’s testamentary disposition. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(C),
§ 304(a)(2)(B) (entitling a statutory class of successors to renewal and extension
upon application with the copyright office); Francis M. Nevins, Little Copyright
Dispute on the Prairie: Unbumping the Will of Laura Ingalls Wilder, 44 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 919, 922–28 (discussing how the renewal reversion provision affected the
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course, any such testamentary transfer remains subject to any un-ter-
minated grants the author made during life, and the rights under the
terminated grant will revert to statutory successors.  As a result,
transfer by will is of limited usefulness for the types of works licensed
for long terms.
An author can transfer copyrights outright, or to a trust for which
one or more individuals are beneficiaries.207  The same is true of
transfers to charities.  With respect to transfers to or for the benefit of
individuals other than qualified charities208 or the author’s surviving
spouse,209 the certainty may come at the cost of estate tax, if the au-
thor’s taxable estate exceeds the unified credit (presently $5.34 mil-
lion for individuals).210  For those fortunate authors, a plan involving
tax-efficient life transfers211 of non-copyright assets may mitigate
some of the effect of the estate tax.
C. Work Made for Hire
For forward-looking authors who value certainty more than the op-
portunity to renegotiate grants and who need to make lifetime trans-
fers, the exclusion of works made for hire from the termination
provisions presents a planning opportunity.  A work prepared by an
employee within the scope of her employment is a work made for
hire,212 and the employer will be considered the author of the work,
and own all rights to it, in the absence of a written agreement to the
contrary.213  This suggests that if an author creates a business entity
and is treated as an employee by the entity, works created as an em-
disposition of Laura Ingalls Wilder’s estate in a manner that clearly contravened
the provisions of her will).  Fortunately for planners, “will-bumping” by renewal
reversion is no longer an issue.  The last possible year in which a pre-1978 work
could have entered its renewal term was 2005, and the time to register a claim
has long since passed. See id. at 931 (celebrating that fact); 17 U.S.C. § 304.
207. See Hader, supra note 176, at 575–76 (suggesting that this approach is best if the
goal is to maximize value).
208. See 26 U.S.C. § 2055(a) (2012) (providing a deduction for bequests to charities).
209. See id. § 2056(a) (2012) (providing a marital deduction for any interest in prop-
erty passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse).  Though copyrights are
terminable interests, see 26 C.F.R. § 20.2056(b)–1(b) (1994), the marital deduc-
tion should be available for a transfer by will. See 26 C.F.R. § 20.2056(b)–1(c), (g)
ex. (6).
210. Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 867.  Note that if the author is married, her
surviving spouse’s unified credit will shelter from estate tax a further $5.43
million.
211. For example, gifts qualifying for the annual exclusion are not subject to gift tax.
See 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) (2012) (excluding from gift tax gifts up to an inflation-
adjusted amount, per person); Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 868 (placing the
inflation-adjusted amount for 2015 at $14,000).  As a result, the amount of the
gift is removed from the grantor’s estate without incurring transfer tax liability.
212. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)
213. Id. § 201(b).
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ployee will be owned by the entity as works made for hire, not subject
to termination.214  Works pre-dating the employment relationship,
however, will still be subject to termination, so transfer by will may be
the best option for these.
In addition to sacrificing the ability to terminate grants, this ap-
proach may, in some cases, result in copyright protection expiring ear-
lier than it otherwise would have.  Copyright in works made for hire
endures for the lesser of ninety-five years from the year of first publi-
cation or 120 years from its creation,215 whereas for other works the
term is the life of the author plus seventy years.216  For a young au-
thor who creates a work at age twenty and lives to age eighty, protec-
tion would ordinarily last a total of 130 years (the sixty years of the
author’s life plus seventy years).  If the author was employed and the
work made for hire, assuming the work remained unpublished, protec-
tion would only last a total of 120 years.
Though there is some basis for challenge,217 at least one reported
case suggests that this approach will work even if the author effec-
tively controls the “employer.”  In Martha Graham School and Dance
Foundation, Inc. v. Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance,
Inc.,218 choreographer Martha Graham’s legatee, Ronald Protas, as-
serted ownership of Graham’s dances by virtue of a residuary clause
214. See also Halperin, supra note 176, at 443 (“On the other hand, the work made for
hire procedure can be beneficial, for example, in that it enables the artist to
transfer her ownership in the entity to a friend without fear that some day her
surviving spouse or issue would eviscerate the entity by terminating the assign-
ment of the copyrights to the entity.”); Aaron J. Moss & Kenneth Basin, Copy-
right Termination and Loan-Out Corporations: Reconciling Practice and Policy,
33 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 55 (2012) (discussing use of a single-employee
loan-out corporation to manage copyrights as giving rise to works made for hire,
not subject to termination).  The principal reasons for creating a loan-out corpora-
tion are limitation of liability and favorable tax treatment. Id. at 72–73.  Because
loan-out corporations must involve a “facially legitimate exchange of rights and
services for appropriate compensation” to avoid challenge by the I.R.S., many
loan-out agreements deem materials produced to be works for hire. Id. at 77.
215. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012).
216. Id. § 302(a).
217. See Donaldson Publ’g Co. v. Bregman, Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d 639 (2d Cir.
1967) (concluding that a songwriter was not an “employee” of a corporation in
which he was one of three shareholders because he was not paid like an em-
ployee, the corporation reserved no right to direct and control his work, and the
parties’ conduct was inconsistent with an employment relationship); Michael H.
Davis, The Screenwriter’s Indestructible Right to Terminate Her Assignment of
Copyright: Once A Story Is “Pitched,” a Studio Can Never Obtain All Copyrights
in the Story, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 93, 116–17 (2000) (“[I]t is not clear
that such writers [employed by their wholly-owned companies] are truly employ-
ees . . . .”). But see Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound
Recordings, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 403–04 (2002) (concluding that works pro-
duced in a loan-out corporation context are ineligible for termination).
218. 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004).
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in Graham’s will.219  The Second Circuit concluded that works pre-
pared by Graham while she was employed as a choreographer by the
Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance were works for
hire.220  As a result, the Center owned the dances for which copyright
had been secured.221  The works were therefore not in her estate, and
had not passed to Protas through the residuary clause.
Protas and amici curiae argued that, given Graham’s influence
over the Center, the dances should not be treated as works made for
hire, notwithstanding the employment agreement.222  They reasoned
that since the purpose of the Center was to foster and support Gra-
ham’s efforts in creating new works, and that as a matter of policy in
such situations, copyright should remain with the author.223  The
court noted that though it might be good creative arts policy, that pol-
icy judgment was a matter of legislative choice, not statutory
interpretation.224
In an unreported case, the District Court of Colorado recently de-
termined that a computer was a work made for hire under the 1976
Act based on the creator’s relationship with the employer.225  This
was true even though he held an ownership interest in the company
(an LLC formed by the plaintiff-employee and defendant), was paid
based on its revenues, and the company did not actually exercise a
great degree of control over his activities.226
219. Id. at 629.
220. Id. at 639–42.
221. See id. at 642.  For the works created before January 1, 1978, whether copyright
had been secured depended on whether they had been published with adequate
statutory notice, as required by the 1909 Act. Id. at 632–33.
222. Id. at 639.  This argument is based at least in part on the test of works made for
hire under the 1909 Act, under which copyright belongs to the person at whose
“instance and expense” the work was created.  Id. at 634–35.  Though Graham
created the dances at the expense of the Center, Protas argued unsuccessfully
that they were not at the Center’s “instance” because Graham would have created
them with or without her employment at the Center.  For works created from
1978 on, the court applied the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY factors used by
the Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730
(1989), to determine whether the works were created in the scope of Graham’s
employment.  Id. at 641.  After noting that the factors weighed in favor of finding
that the dances were within the scope of Graham’s employment, the court again
rejected the argument that Graham’s talent and relationship with the Center ex-
empted her from work-for-hire principles. Id. at 642.
223. Id. at 640.
224. Id.
225. JAH IP Holdings, LLC v. Mascio, No. 13–cv–02195–MSK–KLM, 2014 WL
6477923 (D. Colo. Nov. 19, 2014).  Concededly, this outcome is at odds with Don-
aldson. See supra note 217.  Perhaps the difference is explained to a degree by
the passage of time and by the difference in context (songwriters versus tech
startups).
226. Id. at *6–7.
476 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:441
Because transfers of works for hire are not subject to termination,
authors can use a work-for-hire-for-an-owned-entity approach to avail
themselves of the tax advantages that flow from making lifetime
transfers.227  The author (and owner of the entity) can make annual
gifts of interests in the entity up to the annual gift tax exclusion with-
out incurring any transfer tax consequences.228  Minority interests
may be discounted to reflect the fact that in an arm’s-length transac-
tion, a buyer is willing to pay less for a non-controlling stake in an
entity, further enhancing a donor’s ability transfer property in a tax-
efficient manner by either gift or sale.229  Authors considering this
route should carefully weigh the potential income tax consequences
against the transfer tax benefits.230
VI. CONCLUSION
For better or worse, termination of grants is likely to remain part
of United States copyright law.  Authors have argued for and publish-
ers have grudgingly accepted the need for an opportunity to renegoti-
ate grants.  Along the way, though, neither side has stopped to
consider whether termination interest should pass to a successors de-
fined by Congress or to the beneficiaries designated under an author’s
will.  The latter arrangement is more consistent with American atti-
tudes toward testamentary freedom and the argument that termina-
tion is grounded on renegotiation and valuation difficulties rather
than paternalism.  Modest amendments to the termination provision
could provide authors with more options.  Until Congress turns its at-
tention to the question, however, authors are left with a limited set of
planning tools under which stability of a transfer of copyright may
come at the cost of either the opportunity to renegotiate or additional
estate tax.
Katie Joseph
227. See Halperin, supra note 176, at 444–48.
228. Id. at 444; 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) (2012) (excluding from transfer tax gifts of up to a
certain amount per person each year); Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 868
(noting the annual exclusion for the 2015 calendar year is $14,000).  In other
words, a donor can give property worth up to $14,000 to each of as many individu-
als she pleases in the course of the calendar year without incurring transfer tax
consequences.
229. Halperin, supra note 176, at 445.
230. See id. at 444, 459–61 (summarizing potential tax consequences).
